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ABSTRACT
Every year, criminals launder billions of dollars acquired from seri-
ous felonies (e.g., terrorism, drug smuggling, or human trafficking)
harming countless people and economies. Cryptocurrencies, in
particular, have developed as a haven for money laundering activ-
ity. Machine Learning can be used to detect these illicit patterns.
However, labels are so scarce that traditional supervised algorithms
are inapplicable. Here, we address money laundering detection
assuming minimal access to labels. First, we show that existing
state-of-the-art solutions using unsupervised anomaly detection
methods are inadequate to detect the illicit patterns in a real Bit-
coin transaction dataset. Then, we show that our proposed active
learning solution is capable of matching the performance of a fully
supervised baseline by using just 5% of the labels. This solution
mimics a typical real-life situation in which a limited number of
labels can be acquired through manual annotation by experts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Supervised learning by classifi-
cation; Anomaly detection; Active learning settings; • Applied com-
puting→ Economics.
KEYWORDS
anti money laundering, cryptocurrency, supervised classification,
anomaly detection, active learning
ACM Reference Format:
Joana Lorenz, Maria Inês Silva, David Aparício, João Tiago Ascensão, and Pe-
dro Bizarro. 2020. Machine learning methods to detect money laundering
in the Bitcoin blockchain in the presence of label scarcity. In 2020 ACM
International Conference on AI in Finance, October 15–16, 2020, New York, NY .
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 8 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/1122445.1122456
1 INTRODUCTION
Money laundering is a high-impact problem on a global scale. Crimi-
nals obtain money illegally from serious crimes and inject it into the
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financial system as seemingly legitimate funds. Money laundering
schemes usually involve large amounts of money and, when caught,
typically result in large fines for financial institutions. Recent ex-
amples are the 1MDB [28] and the Danske Bank scandals [26].
Governments and international organizations are building tighter
regulations around money laundering and are broadening them
to include cryptocurrencies [27, 38], where criminals benefit from
pseudonymity.
In the financial sector, Anti-Money Laundering (AML) efforts of-
ten rely on rule-based systems [20]. However, vulnerabilities derive
from the relative simplicity of publicly available rule-sets, leading
to high false-positive rates (FPR) and low detection rates [40]. Ma-
chine learning (ML) techniques overcome the rigidity of rule-based
systems by inferring complex patterns from historical data, and can
potentially increase detection rates and decrease FPRs.
Recently, Weber et al. [41] released a dataset, consisting of a
sample of 200k labeled Bitcoin transactions, and evaluated various
supervised models on it. Unfortunately, supervised methods are
often unfeasible as institutions do not possess large-scale labeled
datasets. This lack of labels is due to two main reasons. First, given
the evolving complexity of money laundering schemes, it is unlikely
to be possible to identify all (or evenmost) of the entities involved in
money laundering. Second, labels resulting from law enforcement
investigations are not immediate, and manual annotation is costly.
Thus, in order to properly evaluate the practical feasibility of ML
for AML, strategies that require no labels (unsupervised learning)
or just a few labels (active learning) are paramount.
We address the real-world challenge of how to detect money
laundering in a dataset with few labels. Particularly, we show that:
(1) Detecting money laundering cases in the Bitcoin network
without any labels is impossible since illicit transactions hide
within clusters of licit behaviour (Section 4.2).
(2) With just a few labels (approximately 5% of the total), one can
match the results of a supervised baseline by using Active
Learning (AL) (Section 4.3). This setting mimics a real-world
scenario with limited availability of human analysts for man-
ual labeling.
We extend the existing research on unsupervised illicit activity
detection in cryptocurrency and financial transactions by bench-
marking different methods on a real-world dataset with a relatively
large number of positive cases. In this way, we overcome the typi-
cal limitation of evaluating on synthetic data or real data with few
positive samples. Besides, to the best of our knowledge, we are the
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first work to apply AL to AML on a large transaction dataset and
in the cryptocurrency setting, specifically.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2
presents the related work. Section 3 details the experimental setup
and introduces the relevant anomaly detection methods as well as
AL concepts. In Section 4 we present our results. Finally, the main
conclusions are discussed in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present previous research on ML for AML in
the context of both financial transactions and, more specifically,
cryptocurrencies. For a thorough survey of ML approaches for AML,
we refer the reader to Chen et al. [9].
Although approaches greatly vary, manymethods assumemoney
laundering cases to be outliers, i.e., illicit instances (a minority)
should exhibit significantly different behaviours from legitimate
ones (the majority). Typically, these approaches use unsupervised
anomaly detection methods to model licit behaviour and find the
instances that deviate from it [4, 8, 13, 17, 21, 22, 32, 37, 39].
Overall, the results of these studies are encouraging, reporting
low FPRs [8, 21, 22] and good detection rates [8, 13, 22, 39]. Some
studies even report that the ML approaches were able to detect
money laundering patterns that were previously unknown [37]
or not caught by rule-based systems [4]. However, a fair compar-
ison between methods is impossible, given the heterogeneity of
the evaluation setups. In these studies, researchers use real-world
datasets labeled by analysts [4, 21, 22], with simulated illicit trans-
actions [13, 37, 39], or no labels at all [17, 32]
Generally, authors are openly doubtful about real-world repro-
ducibility of good results, in the face of intricate patterns and in-
complete labels [8, 13, 39]. The question arises on whether reliable
anomaly detection is possible in non-synthetic data, as criminals
could intentionally mimic normal behaviour. In our research, we
contribute to assess the reproducibility of such results by conduct-
ing the first in-depth benchmark of anomaly detection methods in
a labeled real-world cryptocurrency dataset and comparing their
performance against a supervised baseline.
Previous studies onmoney laundering in cryptocurrencies in par-
ticular are scarce and inconclusive due to a lack of labels for evalua-
tion. Some conclude that supervised models perform well [2, 16, 25].
Others report low detection rates for unsupervised methods in ex-
tremely imbalanced data [24, 25, 30, 31, 42]. Often, the evaluation
of anomaly detection methods consists of checking whether the
anomalies represent extreme cases [30, 31] or behaviour deemed
suspicious by human analysis [15].
Active Learning has been proposed as a method to reduce the
number of labels needed for the training of an effective classifier by
iteratively sampling the most informative samples for labeling from
an initially unlabeled pool [33]. Given the apparent label scarcity
in money laundering data, it is a highly relevant setting for the
practical implementation of ML-based AML systems. Previously,
Deng et al. [11] applied AL to detect money laundering in finan-
cial transactions. In an account-level classification of 92 real-life
accounts, they report that their method can accurately estimate
the threshold hyperplane with only 22% of the labels. AL has also
successfully been applied in other fraud-related use-cases such as
credit card fraud [5] and network intrusion detection [1, 14, 35],
reporting the sufficiency of as few as 1.5% of the original labels to
achieve near-optimal performance [14].
We conduct experiments with AL, assuming an unlabeled dataset
and the capacity to acquire labels progressively to train a supervised
classifier. We hereby extend the study by Deng et al. [11] to a
transaction-level analysis in a much larger cryptocurrency dataset.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
3.1 Data
We use the Bitcoin dataset1 released by Elliptic, a company dedi-
cated to detecting financial crime in cryptocurrencies [41]. It in-
cludes 49 graphs sampled from the Bitcoin blockchain at different
sequential moments in time (time-steps), as presented in Figure 1.
Each graph is a directed acyclic graph, starting from one transaction,
and including subsequent related transactions on the blockchain,
containing approximately two weeks of data.
Figure 1: Structure of the dataset (taken from Bellei [3]).
Bitcoins transactions are transfers from one Bitcoin address (e.g.,
a person or company) to another, represented as nodes in the graph.
Each transaction consumes the output of past transactions and gen-
erates outputs that can be spent by future transactions. The edges
in the graph represent the flow of Bitcoins between transactions.
The dataset consists of 203,769 transactions, of which 21% are
labeled as licit, and 2% as illicit, based on the category of the bitcoin
address that created the transaction. The remaining transactions
are unlabeled. Illicit categories include scams, malware, terrorist or-
ganizations, and Ponzi schemes. Licit categories include exchanges,
wallet providers, miners, and licit services. Each transaction has 166
features, 94 of which represent information about the transaction
itself. The remaining features were constructed by Weber et al. [41]
using information one-hop backward/forward from the transaction,
such as the minimum, maximum, and standard deviation of each
transaction feature. All features, except for the time-step, are fully
anonymized and standardized with zero mean and unit variance.
3.2 Methods
In this section, we give an overview of the methods used in our
experiments and discuss our experimental setup. Following Weber
et al. [41], we split the data into sequential train and test datasets
for all experiments. The train set includes all labeled samples up to
the 34th time-step (16670 transactions), and the test set includes all
1Available at https://www.kaggle.com/ellipticco/elliptic-data-set
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labeled samples from the 35th time-step, inclusive, onward (29894
transactions). Like Weber et al. [41] we evaluate all methods using
the F1-score for the illicit class, hereafter referred to as illicit F1-
score.
3.2.1 Supervised Learning. In order to benchmark unsupervised
methods and AL, we first reproduce the results of Weber et al. [41]
as our baseline.
We train each supervised model on the train set using all 166
features and then evaluate them on the entire test set. To measure
performance over time, and following Weber et al. [41], we also
report the illicit F1-score per time-step in the test set. We use the
scikit-learn [29] implementation of logistic regression (LR) and
random forest (RF) as well as the Python implementation of XG-
Boost [7]. We present the results achieved using default parameters,
as in Weber et al. [41].
3.2.2 Unsupervised Learning. Anomaly detection methods are un-
supervised learning techniques to detect outliers in a dataset. Liter-
ature suggests their effectiveness in the AML context (Section 2).
For a thorough review of anomaly detection, we refer the reader to
the surveys by Chandola et al. [6] and Domingues et al. [12].
The standard definition of outliers refers to instances that are
unlikely to be drawn from the same distribution as the train data
or instances that are far from other data points in the feature space.
Although we focus mainly on unsupervised anomaly detection,
some methods are semi-supervised discriminators trained to learn
a boundary around normal instances. In that context, outliers are
instances that fall outside of the boundary [13].
We test seven common anomaly detection algorithms with read-
ily available Python implementations: Local Outlier Factor (LOF),
K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN), Principal Component Analysis (PCA),
One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM), Cluster-based Out-
lier Factor (CBLOF), Angle-based Outlier Detection (ABOD), and
Isolation Forest (IF). We aim at a diversity of strategies. We use the
PyOD package implementations [43] with default parameters.
LOF and KNN start by computing the distance of each instance to
its k nearest-neighbour. Then, KNN defines that distance as the out-
lier score. LOF uses the distance to compute the instance’s density,
and if the density is substantially lower than the average density of
its k nearest-neighbours, the instance is declared anomalous.
PCA and OCSVM define anomalies as observations that deviate
from normal behaviour. They detect anomalous instances as obser-
vations with a large distance to the principal components (PCA) of
non-anomalous observations or instances that lay outside of the
decision boundary (OCSVM) learned around them.
CBLOF uses the outcome of a clustering algorithm on the in-
stances (in our case k-means) and classifies each cluster as either
small or large. It calculates an anomaly score for each instance,
marking instances that belong to small clusters or that are far from
big clusters as anomalous. ABOD computes the pairwise cosine
similarities between all points and classifies those with a low aver-
age radius and variance as anomalies. Lastly, IF isolates anomalies
by performing recursive random splits on attribute values. Based
on the resulting tree structure, anomalies are instances that are
easy to isolate, i.e., have shorter paths.
The introduced methods use different anomaly scores and scales.
Thus, a fair comparison requires evaluation at different contam-
ination levels, defined as the expected proportion of outliers in
the dataset, and used to set a threshold for the decision function.
Whereas the original PyOD implementation applies the contamina-
tion level on the scores of the train set, we apply it on the test set
scores to guarantee that the desired percentage of positive cases
(anomalies) in the test set is the same across methods. The con-
tamination level here is analogous to a fixed alert rate in real AML
systems, i.e., the percentage of cases flagged for further investiga-
tion by an analyst. We evaluate the illicit F1-score for each model
at contamination levels between 0 and 1, with increments of 0.05.
We also present the illicit F1-score of the RF supervised baseline,
where we define the model threshold by setting the contamination
level as the predicted positive rate (or alert rate), for comparison.
3.2.3 Active Learning. AL is an incremental learning approach
that interactively queries instances for labeling (e.g., by human
analysts) and uses the increasing number of labeled instances to
(re-)train a supervised model. It fits the AML context by addressing
label scarcity and has previously been successfully applied to detect
money laundering accounts based on financial transaction history.
For an extensive survey on AL, we refer the reader to Settles [33].
The goal of AL is to minimize the number of labels necessary to
achieve adequate classifier performance. The process starts with
a pool of unlabeled instances (the unlabeled pool), although some-
times there is a residual number of labels. At each iteration, a query
strategy queries a batch of instances for manual labeling. After
labeling, the instances go into the labeled pool. Finally, a super-
vised algorithm (the classifier) is trained on the labeled pool and
evaluated on a test set. If the performance is not satisfactory, the
querying process continues to enrich the labeled pool incremen-
tally. To mimic the manual labeling process in our experiments, we
append the labels to the queried instances.
In the literature, query strategies build on various models and
uncertainty criteria. In this study, we focus on four query strategies
trained on the labeled pool to find informative instances in the
unlabeled pool. Two of them, uncertainty sampling and expected
model change, are supervised, requiring an underlying supervised
model to define queries. The other two, elliptic envelope and Isola-
tion Forest (IF), are unsupervised and find outlying instances with
regards to the labeled pool. We use random sampling as a baseline.
This setup was based on previous work done on Feedzai’s active
learning annotation tool, which was used to run the experiments.
Expected model change [33, 34] assumes that instances are more
informative if they influence the model more strongly. It queries
the unlabeled instances that lead to the most significant change
in the model parameters by measuring the impact of labeling one
unlabeled instance on the gradient of the model’s loss function.
Thus, this strategy applies only to gradient-based classifiers. In our
experiment, we use LR. The expected model change is a weighted
sum over all possible labels since the labels of the instances are
unknown before querying. Then, at each iteration, we query the
labels of the instances with the largest expected gradients.
Uncertainty sampling is one of the most commonly used query
strategies [19, 33]. It queries the instances about which a model
is most uncertain. Assuming a probabilistic learning model and a
3
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Figure 2: Illicit F1-score for each supervised baseline, across
time-steps.
binary classification problem, this translates to querying the in-
stances with the predicted score closest to 0.5. In our study, we use
the same type of classifier for uncertainty sampling and evaluating
on the test set; for instance, if the classifier is RF, we also conduct
uncertainty sampling using RF.
The two unsupervised query strategies used are IF and elliptic
envelope. Outliers are transactions with high anomaly scores (IF) or
a largeMahalanobis distance to a multivariate Gaussian distribution
fit on the labeled pool (elliptic envelope).
We combine unsupervised and supervised query strategies in
our experiments, depending on the number of illicit instances in
the labeled pool. After an initial random sample of one batch of
instances, we use an unsupervised warm-up learner that samples
instances until the labeled pool includes at least one illicit instance.
When we reach this threshold, we either switch to a supervised hot
learner or continue to use the warm-up learner. As the classifier,
we use the three supervised models evaluated in the supervised
baselines: RF, XGBoost, and LR. We compare all AL setups against a
baseline that queries random instances at each iteration (also used
as a warm-up learner). We use a batch size of 50 instances sampled
at each iteration for all experiments. Each AL setup is run five times
with different random seeds to ensure the robustness of the results.
We assess the performance of each AL setup through the median
illicit F1-score and the confidence intervals at each labeled pool
size.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we present the experimental results for the su-
pervised baseline, followed by the anomaly detection and the AL
benchmarks.
4.1 Supervised baselines
We are able to reproduce the results presented by Weber et al. [41]
closely. Over five runs (with different seeds), we achieve an illicit F1-
score on the test set of 0.76 for XGBoost, 0.45 for LR, and 0.83 for RF.
Thus, the best supervised baseline is achieved with the RFmodel. As
Weber et al. [41], we observe that model performance is profoundly
affected by a sudden dark market shutdown at time-step 43.
Figure 3: UMAP projection of the test set, colored by the la-
bels predicted by IF.
Figure 4: UMAP projection of the test set, colored by the true
labels.
4.2 Anomaly detection
In Table 1, we present the illicit F1-score of the explored anomaly
detection methods as well as the RF supervised baseline at different
contamination levels. Recall that, at each contamination level, we
define the threshold of the RF model so that it leads to an alert rate
equal to that contamination level.
Table 1: Anomaly detection methods illicit F1-score by con-
tamination level (RF supervised baseline for reference).
Model Contamination level0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
RF supervised baseline 0.82 0.58 0.46 0.39
LOF 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.18
ABOD 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
KNN 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
OCSVM 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
CBLOF 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
PCA 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
IF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
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Anomaly detection methods perform significantly below the
RF supervised baseline across all contamination levels. These re-
sults are not consistent with past studies, where anomaly detection
methods perform adequately for AML (Section 2). However, we
note that these studies often use synthetically generated anomalous
data points that are outliers by design. Furthermore, there could be
differences between money laundering patterns in financial trans-
actions and Bitcoin transfers. In the real-life Bitcoin transaction
dataset, we see that illicit cases are indeed not outlying.
To illustrate this, we apply the UniformManifold Approximation
and Projection (UMAP) [23] to the test set and build two plots with
the resulting projection. In the first (Figure 3), we color each obser-
vation based on the predicted label of the worst-performing method
(IF), while in the second (Figure 4), we color each observation based
on the true label. We can then see that the IF classifies most outly-
ing instances as illicit, as intended. Still, the true labels presented
in Figure 4 reveal that the illicit instances in the dataset are not
actually outlying, but instead hiding among licit transactions.
The observation that not all outliers are illicit and that not all
illicit transactions are outliers is reasonable in AML as sophisticated
criminals obfuscate their activity by mimicking normal behaviour,
hiding in regions of high nominal density. This problem was pre-
viously acknowledged by Das et al. [10]. Thus, we conclude that
anomaly detection methods are ineffective for the unsupervised
classification task in this real-life Bitcoin dataset.
4.3 Active learning
Table 2 summarises the results of the AL benchmark for each of
the three different classifiers used for the supervised baselines. We
conclude that switching to a supervised hot-learner significantly
improves performance over the continued use of an unsupervised
warm-up learners. Among hot-learners, however, there is no clear
best policy.
Furthermore, we can see that random sampling as the warm-
up learner leads to a faster improvement in model performance
(i.e., better performance for smaller labeled pool sizes) compared to
anomaly detection methods. This observation aligns with previous
considerations on the poor performance of anomaly detection meth-
ods (Section 4.2). Since these methods fail to detect illicit instances,
they are ineffective at querying illicit instances to be added to the
labeled pool to improve the performance of a supervised classifier
quickly. We observe that elliptic envelope performs above IF (also
consistent with previous results).
Table 2 additionally shows that XGBoost and LR temporarily sur-
pass their supervised baseline, i.e., the performance they achieved
when trained on the entire train set (Section 4.1. The classifiers
perform better when trained only on a sample of the labeled data
but eventually converge to their supervised baseline as the labeled
pool increases over time. This result can be because the labeled
pool consists of the most relevant samples at the beginning of the
AL process and, at the same time, the class imbalance increases
over time. Laws and Schätze [18] acknowledge that, in some cases,
early stopping of an AL process might prevent this model degra-
dation. Note, however, that even if XGBoost and LR surpass their
own supervised baselines, they do not surpass the best supervised
baseline, which was achieved with the RF model.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
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0.25
0.5
0.75
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lic
it
F
1
0.83 (RF supervised baseline)
AL w/ LR classifier
AL w/ XGBoost classifier
AL w/ RF classifier
Figure 5: Best AL setups for each classifier and the RF super-
vised baseline.
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Figure 6: AL versus Random Sampling (RS) with a RF classi-
fier and the RF supervised baseline at 2% illicit rate.
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Figure 7: AL versus Random Sampling (RS) with a RF classi-
fier and the RF supervised baseline at 0.5% illicit rate.
Figure 5 shows the performance over time of the best AL setup
for the three classifiers tested. For comparison, it also includes
the performance achieved by the best supervised baseline, the RF
supervised baseline. With the presented AL setup, all classifiers
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Table 2: Average illicit F1-score over five runs for each AL setup, consisting of an unsupervised warm-up learner, an optional
supervised hot learner and the classifier that is evaluated on the test set. We compare the results to each classifier’s respective
supervised baseline (Section 4.1). Results are ordered by the illicit F1-score with 3000 labels. Best values for each labeled pool
size across classifiers are highlighted in bold.
Query strategies
Classifier
Labeled pool size
Supervised baselineWarm-up learner Hot learner 200 500 1000 1500 3000(0.7%) (1.7%) (3.3%) (5%) (10%)
isolation forest uncertainty sampling
random forest
0.75 0.75 0.80 0.82 0.83
random sampling uncertainty sampling 0.73 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.82
elliptic envelope uncertainty sampling 0.65 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.82
isolation forest expected model change 0.56 0.61 0.77 0.79 0.81
random sampling expected model change 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.83
elliptic envelope expected model change 0.60 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.81
random sampling – 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.80
elliptic envelope – 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.65 0.70
isolation forest – 0.67 0.65 0.59 0.63 0.62
isolation forest uncertainty sampling
XGBoost
0.67 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.80
elliptic envelope expected model change 0.65 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.79
random sampling expected model change 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.78
isolation forest expected model change 0.60 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.75
elliptic envelope – 0.53 0.64 0.53 0.61 0.68 0.76
elliptic envelope uncertainty sampling 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.80 0.64
random sampling uncertainty sampling 0.72 0.76 0.64 0.60 0.64
random sampling – 0.66 0.58 0.75 0.74 0.59
isolation forest – 0.38 0.38 0.46 0.44 0.57
isolation forest expected model change
logistic regression
0.22 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.62
elliptic envelope expected model change 0.20 0.48 0.61 0.61 0.61
random sampling expected model change 0.44 0.54 0.58 0.64 0.60
elliptic envelope uncertainty sampling 0.41 0.52 0.63 0.63 0.60
isolation forest uncertainty sampling 0.37 0.53 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.45
random sampling uncertainty sampling 0.40 0.50 0.57 0.58 0.55
random sampling – 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.39
elliptic envelope – 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22
isolation forest – 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.21 0.02
stabilize after 1000 labels, with RF and XGBoost exhibiting faster
performance increase. RF reaches its baseline’s performance with
only 5% of the original labels, or 1500 out of the original 30000
labels (Figure 5). We can even see a near-optimal performance with
as few as 500 labels.
From Table 2, we can observe that the random sampling baseline
achieves a similar performance to the more sophisticated AL strate-
gies. Our intuition is that the classifier will start approaching good
performances when the labeled pool includes a sufficient number
of illicit instances and, because the dataset has approximately 10%
of illicit cases, random sampling can quickly reach that sufficient
number.
In reality, financial crime is extremely rare among licit transac-
tions, and thus datasets are highly imbalanced Sudjianto et al. [36].
Since we are interested in the practical relevance of AL, we compare
the best performing AL setup against random sampling in a dataset
with a higher, more realistic class imbalance. Specifically, we apply
a random undersampling of the minority class of the Ellipic dataset
to achieve illicit rates of 2% and 0.5%. The results are plotted in
Figures 6 and 7, respectively. For comparison, we indicate the RF
supervised baseline performance at the respective reduced fraud
rates.
As expected, the AL query strategies increasingly outperform
random sampling as imbalance increases. For highly imbalanced
datasets, the best setup uses random sampling (warm-up) followed
by uncertainty sampling (hot learner).
5 CONCLUSION
In this study, we conducted experiments to detect illicit activity
on the Bitcoin transaction dataset released by Elliptic. Using a
supervised setting similar to Weber et al. [41] as our baseline, we
studied the detection ability of machine learning models in a more
realistic setting with restricted access to labels, using unsupervised
methods, and Active Learning (AL).
Our results indicate that unsupervised anomaly detection meth-
ods have poor performance, andwe present evidence that anomalies
in the feature-space are not indicative of illicit behaviour. This find-
ing highlights that experiments conducted on (partially) synthetic
data can be misleading and emphasizes the importance of conduct-
ing experiments on real-life datasets to draw reliable conclusions.
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To improve upon the unsupervised performance, we studied the
case where few labels can be obtained by using AL and determined
the minimum amount of labeled instances necessary to achieve a
performance close to the best supervised baseline. This setting is
realistic and akin to asking money laundering analysts to review
cases that anALmodel indicates as informative.We obtained similar
performance to the best supervised baseline by using just a few
hundred labels (5% of the total).
It remains to explore if the distribution of classes that we found
in the Bitcoin dataset holds for other real-life datasets and different
labeling strategies. Furthermore, given the need for proper AML
processes in the entire financial system, it is crucial to conduct sim-
ilar benchmarks on other verticals such as bank transfers, deposits
or loans, using real datasets with proper labels.
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